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Richard Clarida, Columbia  University and NBER 
Francesco Giavazzi,  IGIER,  Universita'  L. Bocconi  and NBER 
In June  2007  the International  Seminar  on Macroeconomics  (ISoM)  met 
in Istanbul.  The seminar  convened  -  as it has done year after  year since 
1978  -  a group of about thirty European  and American  economists to 
study a variety  of topics within macroeconomics,  defined very broadly. 
As it has become  customary,  we have been hosted by a European  central 
bank, this year the Central  Bank of Turkey.  Authors, discussants, and 
participants  were equally divided between Americans  and Europeans. 
After a long association  with the European  Economic  Review  and the 
Journal  of the European  Economic  Association,  a selection of the papers pre- 
sented in the past four seminars  were published by MIT  Press in three 
volumes entitled NBER  International  Seminar  on Macroeconomics.  Starting 
last year a selection  of the ISoM  papers  was published  by the University 
of Chicago  Press.  This  volume is the second in the new series. 
The volume contains  a selection of the papers originally  presented  at 
the thirtieth  ISoM  meeting,  which took place in Istanbul  on June  15-16, 
2007.  We  thank  our hosts at the Central  Bank  of Turkey,  and particularly 
Hakan  Kara  and the two deputy governors,  Erdem  Ba^i and Mehmet 
Yorukoglu,  who have also kindly accepted  to serve as discussants.  The 
program was organized by Richard  Clarida and Francesco  Giavazzi. 
The decision regarding  publication  of each paper is made by a commit- 
tee consisting  of the six members  of the ISoM  board,  with the advice of 
a referee  when necessary. 
Overview of the Volume 
The  seven papers  published  in this volume cover  quite a range  of topics. 
While the subject  matter  of the chapters  ranges widely, one can weave 
some overarching  themes. The seven chapters  fall into four categories. 2  Clarida  and Giavazzi 
Part  I deals with optimal  monetary  policy,  part  II  with the international 
transmission  of disturbances,  part  III  with capital  account  liberalization, 
and part  IV  with European  financial  integration. 
PART I: Optimal  Monetary Policy 
Central banks have become increasingly transparent,  but just how 
transparent  should they be? Some central  banks (e.g., the Reserve  Bank 
of New Zealand, the Riksbank,  the Bank of Norway) strive to reveal 
just about  everything that  is relevant;  others (e.g., the Bank  of England) 
are more circumspect. Likewise, the academic literature is divided 
about the welfare case for full transparency.  In "Interest  Rate Signals 
and Central Bank Transparency"  Charles Wyplosz, Pierre Gosselin, 
and Aileen Lotz analyze the signaling role of the interest  rate and con- 
sider various degrees of transparency,  ranging  from full opacity,  to just 
publishing the interest rate, to also revealing the signals and an esti- 
mate of their  precision.  The interest  rate  is a special signal because, un- 
like information  about the state of the economy, it can be used by the 
central  bank to affect market  expectations. In other words, it is a ma- 
nipulable signal. The authors  push this logic to its end and assume that 
the interest  rate is only  a signaling device and that it does not play any 
direct macroeconomic  role. If the interest rate allows the central  bank 
to shape expectations,  by optimally choosing the interest rate the cen- 
tral  bank can deal with the unavoidable common knowledge effect in 
a way that is welfare enhancing. That tends to make partial trans- 
parency  preferable  to full transparency  because in the latter  case the in- 
terest rate does not convey any additional information  and cannot be 
used by the central  bank to shape private sector expectations.  If, how- 
ever, the central bank ignores the precision of private sector signals, 
its optimally chosen interest rate may do more harm than good. This 
tends to make full transparency  the best regime choice. The chapter 
produced a lively discussion. Some participants questioned the as- 
sumption that the rate  of interest  is a signal but has otherwise no effect 
on the economy.  Others  observed that the chapter  misses an important 
source of uncertainty:  markets observe the same data as the central 
bank, where the relevant uncertainty  lies in the way the central  bank 
will interpret  these data.  While there  is little the authors  could do about 
the first criticism, the second observation is addressed in the version 
published in this volume. Introduction  3 
PART II: International  Transmission 
"The  Simple  Geometry  of Transmission  and Stabilization  in Closed and 
Open Economies"  by Paolo Pesenti and Giancarlo  Corsetti  provides a 
simple,  but informative,  framework  for understanding  monetary  policy 
choices in an open economy.  The framework  features  a two period, two 
country  analysis and, as the title indicates,  highlights the geometric  in- 
tuition  behind the results.  The  chapter  compares  and contrasts  the cases 
of:  (a)  Closed  and open economies,  (b)  Flexible  and preset  prices,  (c)  Pro- 
ducer and local currency  pricing, (d) Nash and cooperative  equilibria. 
The presentation  at the conference  generated  a lively discussion about 
the generality  of the two by two approach  as well as the intuition  behind 
some of the results. The chapter's  simple geometry was thought to be 
well-suited to provide insights into certain  questions  in particular,  such 
as producer  versus local currency  pricing. 
Charles Engel and Michael Devereux, in "Expectations,  Monetary 
Policy,  and the Misalignment  of Traded  Goods Prices,"  develop a po- 
tentially  important  theme:  that shocks to information  about future  fun- 
damentals  can cause excessive volatility in exchange rates in the pres- 
ence of plausible  market  frictions.  Nominal exchange  rates  are  modeled 
as asset prices, the relative price of two moneys, and are determined 
largely  by expected  future  macroeconomic  conditions.  When  some goods 
prices  are  sticky  in each currency,  exchange  rate  changes  also determine 
changes  in the relative  prices  of goods. There  is a sticky  price  distortion, 
since freely set relative  goods prices do not in general act like the rela- 
tive price of two moneys. Large  nominal exchange  rate swings, reflect- 
ing expectations of the future, can thus lead to substantial  misalign- 
ments in prices, even flexible commodity prices. Engel and Devereux 
point out that even in their  model, a fixed exchange  rate  is not the opti- 
mal policy, because flexibility  helps to obtain the relative price adjust- 
ment needed in response  to current  shocks.  But  they also argue  that  nei- 
ther  is benign neglect the best policy. 
PART III: Capital Account Liberalization 
After liberalizing  the capital  account,  many countries  experience  large 
swings in asset  prices,  capital  flows, and aggregate  production.  In "Cap- 
ital Flows and Asset Prices," Kosuke Aoki, Gianluca Benigno, and 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki  investigate how the adjustment  to capital account 4  Clarida and Giavazzi 
liberalization  depends upon the development of the domestic financial 
system. They show that the less developed the domestic financial  sys- 
tem the more the economy is vulnerable  to domestic and foreign  finan- 
cial shocks.  The mechanism  that drives the result is the difficulty  at en- 
forcing  contracts.  In the small open economy model that they analyze, 
contracts  can only be enforced  if debts are secured  by collateral.  But  the 
assets  that  can  be used as collateral  for  international  borrowing  are  more 
restricted  than domestic  borrowing.  The chapter  generated  a lively dis- 
cussion. The main objections  were related  to the "dum"  character  of the 
capital inflows considered in the model. Moreover,  the distinction  be- 
tween productive  and unproductive  entrepreneurs  is hardly  exogenous 
since, as the Chinese case illustrates  and some participants  noted, For- 
eign Direct  Investment  (FDI)  flows often come with built-in  managerial 
skills that can raise  a firm's  productivity. 
Three facts characterize  countries that have opened up their capital 
account:  (a)  portfolio  holdings are  biased towards  local equity;  (b)  inter- 
national  portfolios are long in foreign currency  assets and short in do- 
mestic currency  assets;  (c) the depreciation  of a country's  exchange  rate 
is associated  with a net external  capital  gain (i.e.,  with a positive wealth 
transfer  from the rest of the world). In "International  Portfolios  with 
Supply,  Demand, and Redistributive  Shocks,"  Robert  Kollmann,  Nico- 
las Coeurdacier,  and Philippe Martin analyze these facts in a two- 
country,  two-good model with trade  in stocks  and bonds. The  two coun- 
tries are subject  to three types of disturbances:  shocks to endowments, 
to the relative  demand for home versus foreign  goods, and to the distri- 
bution of income  between labor  and capital.  With  these shocks,  optimal 
international  portfolios are shown to be consistent with the stylized 
facts. 
Enrique  Mendoza, Vincenzo  Quadrini,  and Jose-  Victor  Rios-Rull,  in 
"On  the Welfare  Implications  of Financial  Globalization  without Finan- 
cial Development"  use a rigorous  multi-country  model with noninsur- 
able  idiosyncratic  risk  to show that,  if countries  differ  in the degree  of as- 
set market  incompleteness,  financial  globalization  can hurt the poor in 
countries  with less developed financial  markets.  This  is because  in these 
countries liberalization  leads to an increase in the cost of borrowing, 
which is harmful  for  the poor  because  they have larger  liabilities  relative 
to their  stock of assets. The quantitative  analysis shows that  the welfare 
effects are sizable and can justify policy intervention.  This is an impor- 
tant question,  because market  incompleteness  does seem to be a major 
challenge  for emerging markets.  But the chapter  also raises other  ques- Introduction  5 
tions.  For  example,  a feature  of the global  economy at present  is the huge 
flow of capital from poor emerging economies to rich emerged econ- 
omies. This  is not well captured  by the model, and it led some in the au- 
dience to question  the implications  of the model for the present  circum- 
stances. 
PART IV: European Financial Integration 
"Financial  Integration  within EU Countries:  The Role of Institutions, 
Confidence,  and Trust"  by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan,  Bent E. Sorensen, 
and Mehmet Fatih Ekinci is an ambitious empirical chapter that con- 
structs  two measures  of de  facto  integration  across European  regions to 
capture  two dimensions of global financial  flows, those for diversifica- 
tion and for development.  The chapter  finds evidence that capital  mar- 
ket integration  within the European  Union is less than what is implied 
by theoretical  benchmarks  and less than  what is found for  U.S. states.  In 
the second  part  of the chapter,  the authors  use data  from  the World  Value 
Surveys  to investigate  the effect  of social capital  on financial  integration 
among European  regions, controlling  for the effect of country-level  in- 
stitutions.  They report  that regions where the level of confidence and 
trust is high are more financially  integrated  with each other.  Thus, the 
authors argue that social capital is a potentially important factor en- 
couraging  capital  inflows. While this is an intriguing  hypothesis, it was 
questioned by some at the conference.  For example, the evaluation of 
capital flows is relative to a very simple theoretical  benchmark  that 
omits variables  that  are in fact  important.  If this were the case, the effect 
of social capital  could capture  these omitted variables. 